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Global development has reached a critical turning point. In addition to 
achieving middle-income status, several recipient countries are now also 
becoming donors and lenders to other developing countries. China in particular 
has rapidly expanded its development finance programme and launched new 
multilateral initiatives. A key example is the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB), a new public development bank that although has developed 
economies, like the UK, as members, derives most of its capital from emerging 
or developing economies. The AIIB has a unique opportunity to learn from 
the positive experiences and mistakes of other public development banks 
such as the World Bank and European Investment Bank. It can also contribute 
to our understanding of development finance by bringing a different set of 
experiences and knowledge to those which underpin these institutions. 
 What Can the Asian 
 Infrastructure Investment Bank 
 Learn from Other 
 Development Banks? 
As its name suggests, the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 
has been created to help close the very 
large infrastructure financing gap in 
Asia, estimated at around US$600bn 
per year, or more once the challenge 
of climate change is taken into 
account. Climate change mitigation has 
created a pressing need for sustainable 
infrastructure. Renewable energy 
is at the heart of this. There is also 
the need to adapt to the changes to 
climate that cannot be avoided, which 
means ‘climate-proofing’ existing and 
new infrastructure facilities. While 
this imperative is clear, however, it 
should also be noted that sustainable 
infrastructure can be more expensive. 
Where this is the case, it will require 
some grant contribution from developed 
country donors for developing countries 
that have neither responsibility for 
creating the problem, nor the capacity 
to address it. Together, mitigation and 
adaptation costs may add 10–20 per cent 
to the infrastructure financing gap. 
While the challenges of climate 
change were not known when today’s 
multilateral development banks (MDBs) 
were established, the need to increase 
investment in infrastructure is certainly 
not new. For reasons such as the 
divergence between private and social 
returns, the scale of capital and time 
frames involved and technical, financial 
and regulatory risk (especially important 
in interregional projects), the private 
sector will generally not supply the 
socially optimal level of infrastructure 
investment. As a result, this has always 
been a core function of governments, 
and national as well as international 
development banks. Indeed, many of 
today’s largest MDBs were, to a greater 
or lesser extent, established to increase 
infrastructure investment. The same is 
true for the AIIB. 
The AIIB is therefore not starting from 
scratch, but has the opportunity to 
learn from the experiences of these 










they have had to tackle many new challenges. 
The importance of ensuring that negative 
environmental and social impacts are 
minimised, for example, has become a crucial 
area for MDBs. Despite the progress that 
has been made in these areas, few would 
suggest that existing MDBs have successfully 
resolved all issues. As well as learning from 
these experiences, therefore, the AIIB has 
the opportunity to have a fresh look at the 
trade-off between those factors and the 
overall development impact of projects, 
including how these vary by country, sector 
and mode of intervention, and the need to 
increase the speed as well as the scale of 
infrastructure investment. 
To begin a contribution to this process, this 
Policy Briefing explores what the AIIB can 
learn about infrastructure finance from the 
experience of the two largest MDBs: the 
World Bank and the European Investment 
Bank (EIB).
A brief overview of two of the 
largest multilateral development 
banks: the World Bank and European 
Investment Bank 
When the World Bank and EIB were first 
set up, like other multilateral and regional 
development banks, they focused primarily 
on infrastructure. The World Bank focused 
first on European post-war reconstruction 
and later on infrastructure in the developing 
world, whilst the EIB provided for regional 
infrastructure, especially in poorer regions, to 
support trade integration. 
In those initial phases, both institutions 
focused on specific projects or sectors. 
Later, the World Bank provided broader 
economy-wide programme lending, which 
often involved wide policy conditionality. 
The EIB, however, maintained its focus on 
infrastructure, expanding instead on its focus 
sectors, for example including health and 
education. By the 2000s, infrastructure still 
accounted for around half of EIB loans. Both 
institutions added sustainable infrastructure to 
their lending priorities.
Reportedly, EIB loans are processed more 
quickly than World Bank loans, which makes 
them far more attractive to borrowers. This 
seems related to their more narrow focus on 
sectors and projects, more rapid procedures 
linked to organisational structure such as 
the EIB not having a resident Board as well 
as reportedly more agile implementation of 
social and environmental standards, as well as 
no broad conditionality.
 
As regards climate change mitigation, though 
implementing environment standards at a 
project level is clearly important, it may be as 
or more important to help countries develop 
strategies to encourage a more sustainable 
development model, by helping fund 
renewable energy and energy efficiency.
Lessons from multilateral and national 
development banks
Sector investment and generating positive 
financial returns
When considering which sectors to invest in, 
it is important to choose those that maximise 
development impact and ensure sufficient 
commercial returns, since these enable a 
bank like the AIIB to maintain its capital and 
ideally expand it. The emphasis should be on 
maximising development impacts. 
The assessment of potential development 
impacts can draw initially on the experience 
of existing MDBs, for example by including a 
shadow price of carbon, as well as successful 
national development banks, such as the China 
Development Bank (CDB) and Germany’s 
development bank KfW. 
Ensuring projects can generate positive 
financial returns requires careful debt 
sustainability analysis to ensure countries 
can pay back loans. The World Bank’s 
losses reflected in its Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries Initiative provides some valuable 
lessons in this respect.
 
Choosing the right mix of instruments
One important criterion for choosing the mix 
of instruments is that they should facilitate 
rapid and significant financing of infrastructure. 
In a recent speech AIIB President, Jin Liqun, 
rightly emphasised the ‘need for speed’. 
Another criterion is that unnecessary financial 
risks should not be created, and excessive 
unfunded contingent claims, for example 
via guarantees, should be avoided. This will 
reduce future losses. Rather than excel in 
‘financial engineering’ as the private financial 
sector has, often resulting in excessive 
systemic risk, the AIIB should excel in actual 
engineering, especially in the earlier phase of 
its establishment. 
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social impacts are 
minimised, and the 
overall development 
impact of projects.”
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impacts and the 
quality of social 
and environmental 
outcomes.”
To fulfil these criteria, simple instruments such 
as ‘plain vanilla’ loans are most appropriate, 
especially for a new MDB, as they will allow 
rapid growth of lending to infrastructure, as 
well as minimise risks. If a new MDB such 
as the AIIB can establish a good asset book 
based on simple instruments, good repayment 
record, and strong decision-making process, 
it has the potential to achieve better rating 
than the average of its shareholders. This has 
worked well for institutions such as the World 
Bank and the EIB, who have maintained an 
AAA rating, whilst many of their shareholders 
have a lower one. 
To achieve greater leverage over time, 
other instruments, such as guarantees to 
private investors and lenders, will need to be 
developed. Guarantees are safer if they are 
at least partly funded ex ante, and if the risks 
for which guarantees are provided are clearly 
capped.
While increasing the speed of transactions is 
essential, it is very important that this is not 
achieved at the expense of project quality, 
including from a social and environmental 
perspective. While these risks can be 
mitigated, for example by recruiting high-
quality and experienced staff to the AIIB 
and by learning from the experiences, both 
positive and negative, of existing multilateral, 
regional and national development banks, it is 
important that they are actively addressed, by 
rigorous evaluation of commercial viability and 
development impacts. 
Ideally, the aim should be to maximise the 
speed of operations without compromising 
on beneficial development impacts and the 
quality of social and environmental outcomes. 
This is a critically important issue for global 
development finance where the AIIB could 
bring real additionality. By commencing 
operations, the AIIB will automatically increase 
the quantity of investment in infrastructure. If it 
can also accelerate the investment process this 
quantity affect will be amplified, particularly if 
other MDBs learn from its innovations. If it can 
achieve this while also maintaining, or even 
enhancing the quality of projects, the positive 
development impacts will be huge. 
Lending limits and leverage ratios
The World Bank has a ‘statutory lending limit’ 
of 100 per cent of total subscribed capital, 
retained earnings and reserves – a leverage 
of 1:1. In contrast, the EIB lending limit may 
not exceed 250 per cent of subscribed capital, 
reserves and retained earnings, implying a 
higher leverage ratio of 2.5:1. 
A higher leverage ratio allows higher levels of 
lending, for any given level of total subscribed 
capital. For example, the current level of 
subscribed capital could only allow US$100bn 
total stock of loans for AIIB, but if leverage 
was increased, for example to 1.5:1, this could 
increase to US$150bn. Reportedly, such a 
higher leverage would not impair rating of a 
bank like the AIIB, but further research may be 
needed to ensure that is the case. 
Knowledge bank
The World Bank’s role grew from one that 
was just focused on development financing to 
becoming a knowledge bank that produced 
theory and policy applications for global 
development.
This knowledge is produced in different ways: 
research by the World Bank’s own research 
department; applied analytical studies in 
operational departments; training programmes 
developed and delivered by the World Bank 
Institute and a number of further powerful 
global knowledge and policy networks, such 
as the Global Development Network (GDN), 
initially launched by the World Bank in 1999 
before becoming an independent not-for-
profit in 2001.
The AIIB offers the following potential 
advantages: 
• specialisation in Asia and infrastructure development;
• openness and inclusiveness; 
• high standards;
• innovation in voting rights, staff recruitment, and 
procurement; 
• regional economic growth, integration and mobilisation of 
finance across borders; 
• public–private partnership component; 
• alleviation of geopolitical tensions and reconciliation of 
differences at the multilateral level.
Challenges for the AIIB include: 
• balancing demand and standards;
• creating a fair governance structure;
• delineating China’s role in the bank;
• establishing a cooperative relationship with existing MDBs;
• influencing the international governance regime;
• ameliorating safeguards problems among infrastructure 
projects.
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Policy recommendations
• Remain focused on infrastructure for the time being: The examples of 
the World Bank and the EIB show that the AIIB’s and the New (BRICS) 
Development Bank (NDB)’s initial focus on infrastructure will pay dividends, 
particularly in the face of existing and enormous needs in Asia, estimated to 
reach US$600bn a year.
• Focus on sustainable as well as inclusive development: With the AIIB and 
NDB being the first major multilateral development banks created when 
climate change has finally been acknowledged as a major issue to be addressed 
internationally, the banks have an opportunity to pioneer the design and funding 
of positive strategies that support sustainable and inclusive development, for 
example around renewable energy or labour-intensive technologies/sectors.
• Conditions based on projects and sectors will strengthen relations: The new 
banks’ conditions, which are linked to projects and sectors, and are not economy-
wide conditionality, will facilitate allowing countries’ policy space. However, country 
creditworthiness must be carefully assessed, to prevent AIIB and NDB losses.
• Borrowers will welcome AIIB intention to accelerate speed of transactions 
while not compromising the quality of projects: When it comes to 
accelerating the speed of transactions, the AIIB can learn from the experience 
of the EIB and national development banks such as the CDB. It is crucial that 
this is not achieved at the expense of the quality of projects, and that social 
and environmental safeguards are not compromised. One solution could be to 
rely more on borrower countries to ensure standards, increasing efficiency and 
speed, but also building country ownership on these issues. 
• Use ‘plain vanilla’ loans and avoid complexity and opacity: Instruments used 
should be ‘plain vanilla’, that are simple to facilitate speedy loans, as well as limit 
future risks to the AIIB and NDB. Complexity and opaqueness breed risk of 
future losses.
• Increase ratio of total loans to total subscribed capital (leverage) if AIIB wants 
lending to be quickly ramped up, and if capital itself is not increased. This needs, 
however, more study and consultation, for example with rating agencies.
• Establish a knowledge bank around all aspects of infrastructure and its 
financing: AIIB should consider establishing itself as a centre of world excellence 
on all aspects of infrastructure and its financing. This could later lead to new and 
broader development knowledge creation, building on its experience and that 
of its members. The knowledge bank would complement, rather than compete 
with that of the World Bank.
• Opportunity for China to demonstrate commitment to transparency and 
openness: New multilateral initiatives – such as the AIIB, NDB and the One 
Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative – will serve as key opportunities for China to 
demonstrate its commitment to increased transparency and openness. While 
the China-led AIIB might not radically alter development finance, it would 
directly impact multilateral engagement. The bank’s 57 founding members thus 
can play a central role in the future of global governance regimes.
